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A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
Abstract
Critics have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has been estimated that
this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution system. Yet, the practice continues.
In this paper, we propose a price discrimination model of trade promotions. We show that in a distribution
channel characterized by a dominant retailer, a manufacturer has incentives to price discriminate between the
dominant retailer and smaller independents. While offering all retailers the same pricing policy, price
discrimination can be implemented through trade promotions because they induce different inventory-
ordering behaviors on the part of retailers.
Differences in inventory holding costs have been shown to be an important determinant of consumer
promotions. Our analysis suggests that differences in holding costs are also potentially an important driver for
the use of trade promotions. The implications from our model explain a number of anecdotal and/or
empirically observed puzzles about how trade promotions are practiced. For example, our analysis explains
why chain stores welcome trade promotions but independents do not. Our analysis outlines implications for
managing trade promotions.
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A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
Abstract
Critics have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has
been estimated that this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution
system. Yet the practice continues. In this paper, we propose a price-discrimination model of
trade promotions. We show that in a distribution channel characterized by a dominant retailer,
a manufacturer has incentives to price-discriminate between the dominant retailer and smaller
independents. While o®ering all retailers the same pricing policy, price-discrimination can be
implemented through trade promotions as trade promotions induce di®erent inventory-ordering
behaviors on the part of retailers.
Di®erences in inventory holding costs have been shown to be an important determinant of
consumer promotions. Our analysis suggests that di®erences in holding costs are also potentially
an important driver for the use of trade promotions. The implications from our model explain
a number of anecdotal and/or empirically observed puzzles about how trade promotions are
practiced. For example, our analysis explains why chain stores welcome trade promotions but
independents do not. Our analysis outlines implications for managing trade promotions.
(Keyword: Channels of Distribution; Channel Power; Trade Promotion; Forward-Buying)
1. Introduction
According to the most recent estimate, consumer goods manufacturers in US spend about $85 billion
on trade promotions amounting to 13% of sales. In comparison, consumer promotions account for
6%, and advertising and media spending only 4% of sales (Cannondale Associates 2002). Although
trade promotions are widely used by manufacturers, they are often seen as wasteful. For example,
Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon (1990) argue that trade promotions impose severe administrative
burdens on manufacturers and add huge inventory costs to distribution channels.1
Many have asked the question that if trade promotions are indeed ine±cient, why are man-
ufacturers still using them? A number of explanations have been proposed in the literature. It
has been suggested that manufacturers face a Prisoners' Dilemma like situation { they have to
o®er trade promotions, otherwise the competition will take business away from them (e.g., Drμeze
and Bell 2003). Lal (1990) shows that national brand manufacturers could use trade promotions
to limit the encroachment from a store brand. Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas (1996) suggest that
allowing retailers to forward buy bene¯ts competing manufacturers since forward buying decreases
the intensity of competition between manufacturers. Agrawal (1996) analyzes the role of brand
loyalty in determining optimal advertising policy (defensive strategy to build brand loyalty) and
trade promotion policy (o®ensive strategy to steal customers from competition).
In this paper, we o®er another explanation for trade promotions. Our explanation essentially
establishes the price discrimination role of trade promotions in a channel context: manufacturers can
use trade promotions to price discriminate between large retailers (e.g., chains) and small retailers
(e.g., independents) by exploiting their di®erent inventory carrying costs. Blattberg, Eppen, and
Lieberman (1981) have shown that retailers can take advantage of the di®erences in consumers'
inventory carrying costs. In this paper we show that manufacturers can similarly take advantage
of the di®erences in retailers' inventory holding costs to achieve price discrimination through trade
1According to one estimate, $75-$100 billion worth of inventory is added into US distribution channel because of
trade promotions. See Kahn and McAlister, 1997, page 21.
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promotions.
However, price discrimination in a channel context is not a straightforward extension of that
in a non-channel context, as multiple channel members are now involved in pricing and inventory
decisions. More importantly, this price discrimination explanation for trade promotions results
in a number of interesting predictions that are consistent with some of the otherwise puzzling
observations in the area of trade promotions. For example, the predictions from our analysis
explain why:
1. Manufacturers schedule their trade promotions well ahead to make it possible for retailers to
plan forward buying.
2. Trade promotions are observed for packaged goods but not for perishable goods (Sellers 1992).
3. Chain stores are happier with trade promotions but independent and convenience stores not.2
4. Manufacturers allow forward buying but forbid diverting.
5. Manufacturers are complaining much more about trade promotions in recent years.
We believe that our ability to explain all these in the context of a parsimonious model suggests that
the model is potentially useful. More speci¯cally, in the context of a channel consisting of a single
manufacturer and multiple retailers, we show that a manufacturer can e®ectively price discriminate
among retailers by o®ering trade promotions if retailers have di®erent inventory holding costs. The
stores with lower holding costs and higher warehouse capacity (usually dominant retailers like chain
stores and warehouse clubs) can bene¯t from forward buying. Interestingly, we further show that
not only does the retailer with low holding costs bene¯t from trade promotions, but the retailer
2Independents and wholesalers who act as buying agents for independents always complain that trade promotions
are not a fair practice for them (Zwiebach 1990, U.S. Distribution Journal 1992). For example, \Not surprisingly, in
a broad survey of wholesalers, 87 percent agreed that the most urgent issue facing the wholesale-supplied system is
fair and equal access to trade promotion funds." (U.S. Distribution Journal 1993b). On the other hand, chain stores
bene¯t more from trade promotions and are happy with trade promotions (Progressive Grocer 2002, U.S. Distribution
Journal 1993a). For instance, \Results also noted in the study show that wholesalers and their independent retail
customers tend to bene¯t less from trade allowance programs than do other distribution channels." (U.S. Distribution
Journal 1993a).
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with high holding costs can also bene¯t from this practice. Indeed, social welfare can also increase.
Although we initially derive these results in a dominant retailer channel setting (Samuelson and
Nordhaus 1989), we show in the technical appendix accompanying this paper (available on the
Website of this journal) that these results hold in a more general competitive channel setting also.
To the extent that a manufacturer can use trade promotions to price discriminate between re-
tailers, Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) is closely related to our study. However, our research di®ers
from theirs. In their model, the retailers are not making pricing decisions.3 We explicitly model
retailers' pricing decisions over time. Our model therefore takes the Jeuland and Narasimhan's
analysis to the next logical step. This generalization yields interesting insights. One of these in-
sights is that trade promotions can alleviate the double marginalization problem by giving the
leading retailer more incentives to charge a lower retail price.4 5 In addition, the model allows us
to make some testable predictions about the practice of trade promotions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the dominant retailer
model. The analysis in Section 3 consists of two parts. The ¯rst part outlines the benchmark case
where the manufacturer is not allowed to o®er trade promotions and analyzes the manufacturer's
incentives to price discriminate between a dominant retailer and the competitive fringe. The second
part derives the manufacturer's optimal trade promotion strategies and the retailers' optimal pricing
and inventory decisions. Section 4 derives a number of interesting predictions regarding the e®ect
of trade promotions on the manufacturer's pro¯ts, retailers' pro¯ts, and social welfare. Section 5
relaxes some assumptions used in the model. We conclude with a summary in Section 6.
3In Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985), a seller could price discriminate between more intensely consuming and less
intensely consuming customers by o®ering temporary price cuts. In order to make this section consistent with the
rest of the paper, we are using \manufacturer" and \retailers" as in the rest of paper to represent the \seller" and
\customers" in Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985), respectively. We thank anonymous Reviewer 3 for the suggestion.
4Double marginalization problem refers to the situation where the economic interests of upstream and downstream
¯rms are not aligned such that the retail price facing end users is too high to maximize channel pro¯ts, as illustrated
in Jeuland and Shugan (1983).
5Bruce, Desai and Staelin (2005) show that manufacturers of more durable products give deeper promotional
discounts, which helps mitigate the double-marginalization problem. One of the di®erences between our research and
theirs is that our research shows manufacturers can use trade promotions to alleviate double-marginalization through
price discriminating between retailers. Their research shows that manufacturers selling a more durable product o®er
a greater depth of trade promotions and therefore have a less sever double marginalization problem.
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2. The Model
Consider a stylized channel where a manufacturer is selling a product through a dominant retailer
(e.g., a chain store) and the competitive fringe (e.g., smaller independent retailers). The dominant
retailer sets the retail price (p), and the competitive fringe takes the retail price as the market price
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989).6 We start with the dominant retailer model for three reasons.
First, the phenomenon of \power retailers" is a familiar scene in today's retailing landscape and
large retailers are becoming increasingly dominant in the marketplace.7 8 Second, large chains
often assume the role of price leadership and exert pricing in°uence over smaller retailers (Raju
and Zhang 2005). Third, the dominant retailer model simpli¯es the expositions considerably. As
we show in Technical Appendix, if we were to relax the key assumption of only the dominant
retailer setting the retail price and introduce price competition, our conclusions will not change
qualitatively.9
The total market demand in each period is given by Q = a ¡ bp, where a > 0 and b > 0 are
constants. The dominant retailer faces a downward-sloping demand function given by
Qd = a¡ b1p: (2.1)
6Formally, the competitive fringe supplies at the quantity where the price equals the (rising) marginal cost.
7In the grocery industry, for example, mass merchandisers, warehouse clubs, and chain stores account for 23% of
total grocery sales in 2002, while that number was only 9% in 1995 (The McKinsey Quarterly 2003). Furthermore,
the number of grocery chain stores in the U.S. was 18,400 in 1980, accounting for 52.7% of the total number of grocery
stores. By 2003, the number of chain stores has mushroomed to 21,560 accounting for 65.4% of the total number of
grocery stores. In the meantime, the share of dollar sales for chain stores increases from about 60.2% to 82.7%. Not
surprisingly, Independents shrank in number from 16,500 in 1980 to 11,421 in 2003 and their dollar sales percentage
decreased from 39.8% to 17.3% (Progressive Grocer Annual Report 1981, 2003).
8There are several recent papers studying how the emergence of dominant retailers a®ects the interactions between
channel members. In a bargaining model, Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan (2006) show that manufacturers may bene¯t
from the increase in retailer dominance since channel e±ciency can improve with dominant retailers gaining cost
advantages. Geylani, Dukes, and Srinivasan (2005) show that a manufacturer has an incentive to engage in joint
promotions and advertising with weaker retailers since the manufacturer gets a higher margin with weaker retailers
than with dominant retailers, who has the power to dictate the wholesale price.
9In some industries, small stores can form cooperatives such as buying clubs to get promotional discounts from
manufacturers or can make purchases from a middle party like a wholesaler, who buys from manufacturers for many
small stores. The former case can be analyzed using the competitive model in Technical Appendix TA. The current
paper is limited in analyzing the later case since we do not model a wholesaler between the manufacturer and retailers.
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The demand facing the competitive fringe in each period is correspondingly, 10
Qc = Q¡Qd = (b1 ¡ b)p: (2.2)
In this dominant retailer channel, the competitive fringe's demand is increasing in retail price p
while the dominant retailer's is decreasing in p such that these two di®erent types of retailers do
compete with each other. Figure 1 illustrates the demand functions at the retail level. We assume
b < b1 · 3b2 in our analysis to avoid any corner solution.
Q
p
a/b
a/b1
a
Q = a – b p
Q
d = a – b
1 pQ
c
= 
(b
1
–
b)
p
0
Figure 1: Retailers' Demands for b < b1 · 1:5b
In this channel, all retailers incur a holding cost for any inventory carried from one period to
the next. In practice, chain stores and warehouse clubs usually have lower inventory costs than
independents. One reason could be a lower cost of capital. Further, chain stores and warehouse
clubs also have higher inventory holding capacity and much more shelf space than independents,
a big component of inventory holding costs, especially for food retailers (Blattberg, Eppen and
Lieberman 1981). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume a lower inventory holding cost for the dom-
inant retailer.11 We assume that the dominant retailer has a ¯nite unit holding cost (0 · h1 <1)
10It is worthy of noting that the competitive fringe in this paper is considered as a group of independents that is
modeled as a single entity. Each independent in the competitive fringe is weak in terms of market power compared
with the single dominant retailer. We thank anonymous Reviewer 3 for suggesting to make this point clear.
11Further, in Appendix A we also show that the dominant retailer has more incentives than retailers in the
competitive fringe to reduce unit holding cost rate, since the economic reward from a unit of reduction in holding
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and retailers in the competitive fringe have an in¯nite unit holding cost (h2 = 1). It is impor-
tant to note that the in¯nite inventory holding cost for a competitive fringe is only a simplifying
assumption, and we relax the assumption in Technical Appendix where we allow a ¯nite di®erence
in the inventory holding costs between the dominant retailer and retailers from the competitive
fringe. As the manufacturer's production costs do not a®ect our substantive conclusions, we set
them equal to zero for simplicity.
Manufacturer's Decision Variables: The manufacturer in our model announces a wholesale
price wi for each period i within a pricing cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1; :::;N).
12 The length
of the pricing cycle N is also a manufacturer decision variable. The manufacturer's objective is to
maximize the average pro¯t per period within a pricing cycle.13
Dominant Retailer's Decision Variables: Conditional on the manufacturer's decisions on the
length of a pricing cycle (N) and the wholesale prices in each period within the cycle (w1; w2; :::; wN ),
the dominant retailer sets the retail price pi for periods i = 1; 2; :::;N to maximize its total pro¯t in
each pricing cycle. As the dominant retailer has a ¯nite holding cost, some inventory may be carried
from one period to the next if forward buying is pro¯table. Therefore, the dominant retailer also
makes decisions on Qi;jd , the inventory the dominant retailer orders in period i and sells in period
j, where i; j 2 f1; :::; Ng and i · j.
Competitive Fringe's Decision Variables: Retailers in the competitive fringe take pi as the
market price in each period i. As the holding cost for these retailers is assumed to be in¯nite, they
do not carry any inventory from one period to the next. Therefore, a retailer in the competitive
fringe will buy the product from the manufacturer and sell to customers if wi · pi in period i.
cost rate is higher for the dominant retailer who makes forward buying than for the competitive fringe. Therefore,
the dominant retailer will have a lower unit holding cost than the competitive fringe in the long run, which further
validates our assumption.
12In this paper, we are modeling o®-invoice trade promotions.
13For an early proof for the equivalence between maximizing average pro¯t per period and maximizing total pro¯t
as discount factor approaches zero, see Jewell (1963).
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Mathematically, the manufacturer solves the following optimization problem
max
w1;w2;:::;wN ;N
"PN
i=1wi(
PN
j=iQ
i;j
d +Q
i;i
c )
N
#
;
where Qi;jd denotes the inventory the dominant retailer orders in period i and sells in period j,
and Qi;ic the inventory the retailers in the competitive fringe order and sell in period i. Of course,
we have Qi;jc = 0 for any i6= j, as a competitive fringe does not carry any inventory. Given the
manufacturer's wholesale prices and the length of pricing cycle (w1; w2; :::; wN ; N), the dominant
retailer's optimization is given by
max
p1;p2;:::;pN ;Qi;j
d
24 NX
j=1
jX
i=1
[pj ¡ wi ¡ h1(i¡ 1)]Qi;jd
35 :
We summarize the timing of decisions in this channel in Figure 2.
Manufacturer decides:
the length of pricing 
cycle and wholesale 
prices for each period 
over the cycle
Dominant retailer and 
the competitive fringe 
decide: 
how much to purchase 
from the manufacturer
Dominant retailer sets 
the retail price
Competitive fringe 
meets the residual 
demand
Figure 2: Timing of Decisions in Dominant Retailer Channel
The model speci¯ed above can result in a number of di®erent pricing outcomes. Figure 3 illus-
trates several possible optimal wholesale price schedules. We de¯ne trade promotions as temporary
price discounts o®ered by the manufacturer to retailers. Therefore, all the schedules except Case
(a) in Figure 3 could be viewed as trade promotion schedules. For instance, in Figure 3(b), w1 is
the discounted wholesale price and w2 is the regular wholesale price. If the manufacturer o®ers a
low price in one period and charges higher and increasing prices for the following two periods as in
3(d), then w1 and w2 are both promotional wholesale prices and w3 is the regular wholesale price.
7
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
time
(periods)
wholesale price
time
(periods)
wholesale price
time
(periods)
wholesale price
time
(periods)
wholesale price
1 2 3 4 ... 1 2
1 2 3 1 2 3
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
w1 w2 w3 w4 :::
w1
w2
w1
w2 w3
w1
w2
w3
One Pricing Cycle¾ -
wholesale price
Figure 3: Examples of Optimal Wholesale Price Schedules
3. Analysis
We ¯rst show why the manufacturer has an incentive to price discriminate. We analyze the manu-
facturer's and the dominant retailer's pricing decisions, assuming that the manufacturer charges a
time-invariant single wholesale price to all retailers. This case of no trade promotions is our bench-
mark for comparison with the case where the manufacturer o®ers trade promotions to the retailers.
We will show that under some conditions, trade promotions can increase the manufacturer's pro¯ts
as well as channel pro¯ts, even after accounting for the additional inventory costs that are added
into the channel as a consequence of forward buying by the dominant retailer.
3.1 Manufacturer's Incentives to Price Discriminate between Retailers
If the manufacturer does not o®er trade promotions, i.e., that the wholesale price is constant over
time, all retailers will order from the manufacturer in each period and none will carry any inventory
from one period to the next. The optimal prices and pro¯ts are easy to determine, and we simply
state these in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 If the manufacturer is restricted to o®ering a common time-invariant wholesale price
8
to retailers, then the manufacturer will set its wholesale price at ws =
a(2b1¡b)
2bb1
and the dominant
retailer sets its retail price at ps =
a(2b1+b)
4bb1
. The manufacturer's average sales and pro¯t per period
are given by Qs =
a(2b1¡b)
4b1
and ¦s =
a2(2b1¡b)2
8bb21
respectively.
Proof of Lemma 1. Please see Appendix B.14
Of course, a single wholesale price is sub-optimal for the manufacturer for two reasons. First,
the competitive fringe is passive in setting the retail price in the channel, and it will meet the
residual demand as long as the wholesale price it has to pay is less or equal to the retail price
set by the dominant retailer. Thus, ideally, the manufacturer wants to be able to charge the
competitive fringe a higher wholesale price equal to the retail price so as to take away all the
pro¯ts from the competitive fringe. Second, the manufacturer must also be mindful of the \double
marginalization" problem dissipating channel pro¯ts because of too high a retail price. As only
the dominant retailer's marginal cost will determine the retail price, if possible the manufacturer
ideally wants to charge a lower wholesale price only to the dominant retailer. Therefore, to alleviate
the double marginalization problem, and to take advantage of the price following behavior in the
channel, it is in the manufacturer's interest to price discriminate between the dominant retailer and
the competitive fringe. However, charging di®erent wholesale prices to di®erent retailers who are
competing in the same market is unlawful. The manufacturer must ¯nd some other mechanisms
to reap the bene¯ts of price discrimination. Trade promotions, or time-variant wholesale prices, is
one such pricing mechanism.
3.2 Trade Promotions as A Mechanism to Price Discriminate
When the manufacturer o®ers trade promotions, it o®ers the same wholesale prices to all retailers.
Thus, nominally, the manufacturer does not price discriminate. However, as inventory holding
costs di®er among retailers, not all retailers can take advantage of trade promotions to the same
degree. The retailers in the competitive fringe do not carry any inventory from one period to
14Unless stated otherwise, proofs for lemmas and propositions are provided in the Appendix at the end of this
paper..
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the next, as their holding cost is assumed to be in¯nite (relaxed later). The dominant retailer
¯nds it desirable to carry inventory acquired at the promotional wholesale price to those periods
with higher wholesale prices, i.e. to forward buy, if its unit holding cost (0 · h1 < 1) is low
enough. Because it is more pro¯table to buy in promotional periods and carry inventory forward,
the e®ective wholesale prices are lower for the dominant retailer than for the competitive fringe.
Thus, trade promotions enable the manufacturer to price discriminate.
In Lemma 2, we formalize this intuition, stating the manufacturer's and retailers' optimal
strategies when trade promotions are o®ered in the channel.
Lemma 2 If the dominant retailer has a positive unit holding cost (0 < h1 < 1), while the
competitive fringe has an in¯nite unit holding cost (h2 = 1), then the manufacturer will o®er
the lowest wholesale price in the ¯rst period and charge an increasing wholesale price in each of
the following N ¡ 1 periods within any N-period pricing cycle. The promotional wholesale price
w1 in the ¯rst period, the wholesale prices wi in the i
th period (2 · i · N), the retail price pj
(1 · j · N), dominant retailer's sales Qdj in the jth period, competitive fringe's sales Qcj in the
jth period, average sales per period Qh1 , and the manufacturer's average pro¯t per period ¦h1 are
respectively given by8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
w1 =
N [4ab1¡2ab¡b1bh1(N¡1)]
2b1[b(N+1)+b1(N¡1)]
wi =
a+b1w1+b1h1(i¡1)
2b1
i = 2; :::; N
pj = a+b1w1+b1h1(j¡1)2b1 j = 1; :::; N
Qdj =
a¡b1w1¡b1h1(j¡1)
2 j = 1; :::; N
Qcj =
(b1¡b)[a+b1w1+b1h1(j¡1)]
2b1
j = 1; :::; N
Qh1 =
1
4b1
[4ab1 ¡ 2ab¡ 2bb1w1 ¡ bb1h1(N ¡ 1)]
¦h1 =
1
N
h
w1
PN
j=1Qdj +
PN
i=1wiQci
i
; (3.1)
and we also have ½
wi = p
i i = 2; :::; N
pi ¡ pi¡1 = h12 i = 2; :::; N
: (3.2)
Figure 4 shows the manufacturer's and the retailer's optimal prices within a pricing cycle when
N is equal to 5. The retail price will be raised by h12 per period, as the dominant retailer's e®ective
10
-
6
time
(periods)
price
1 2 3 4 5 ...
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
One Pricing Cycle¾ -
retail price
wholesale price
Figure 4: Optimal Wholesale and Retail Prices within A Pricing Cycle for N = 5
unit acquisition cost increases at the rate of h1 per period.
15 The manufacturer also raises the
wholesale price by the same amount to take the surplus away from the competitive fringe. Thus, at
any o®-promotion period, the dominant retailer prefers to lower its price in the current period to
sell more, instead of carrying any inventory forward to the next period. The manufacturer charges
a wholesale price equal to the retail price in period i (i = 2; :::; N) in order to get all surplus from
the competitive fringe. To determine the length of pricing cycle N , the manufacturer solves the
optimization problem:
max
N
¦h1(N)
s:t: w1 + (i¡ 1)h1 · wi; i = 1; :::; N
w1 =
N [4ab1 ¡ 2ab¡ b1bh1(N ¡ 1)]
2b1[b(N + 1) + b1(N ¡ 1)] (3.3)
wi =
a+ b1w1 + b1h1(i¡ 1)
2b1
; i = 2; :::; N
N ¸ 1:
15As we show in Extensions, it is not necessary for wholesale prices to increase every period in order for the
manufacturer to price discriminate between retailers. Two price points are su±cient for price discrimination to occur
and allow the manufacturer to capture the bulk of the bene¯ts from trade promotions.
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The constraints w1+(i¡ 1)h1 · wi guarantee that the dominant retailer's e®ective unit acqui-
sition cost of the items sold in period i = 2; :::;N is no higher than the wholesale price in the same
period, so that the dominant retailer does not ¯nd it worthwhile to purchase from the manufacturer
in period i at the current wholesale price. As the dominant retailer's e®ective acquisition cost per
unit is increasing at a faster rate (h1 per period) than the wholesale price (
h1
2 per period) over time,
there is an upper limit for N beyond which it is not pro¯table for the dominant retailer to carry any
inventory. The constraints thus provide an upper bound on the manufacturer's decision variable
N . As the range for N is convex and compact, there always exists a solution to the optimization
problem (3.3). Given the optimal N and the sequence of wholesale prices preannounced by the
manufacturer, retailers will not carry any inventory from one pricing cycle to the next since the ¯rst
period in the next pricing cycle will be a promotional period again. The manufacturer's decisions
on N and the sequence of wholesale prices in a pricing cycle will therefore not depend on its deci-
sions in any other pricing cycles. In Appendix C, we show that the manufacturer's announcement
of both the length of pricing cycles N and the sequence of wholesale prices is credible. The man-
ufacturer has no incentive in any period within a pricing cycle to deviate from the preannounced
N and wholesale prices.16 This suggests that both the manufacturer's and retailers' behaviors are
independent between pricing cycles.
It follows from the analysis above that the e®ective unit acquisition cost for the dominant
retailer is lower than that for the competitive fringe in period i = 2; :::; N , or w1 + h1(i¡ 1) < wi
for i = 2; :::;N . This leads to our ¯rst Proposition.
Proposition 1 The manufacturer can use trade promotions to price discriminate between retailers
who have di®erent inventory holding costs.
Proposition 1 formally suggests a new justi¯cation for trade promotions not previously recog-
nized in the literature. While o®ering the same wholesale price to all retailers but varying it over
16We thank AE and anonymous Reviewers 1 and 4 for pointing out this to us. In practice, the manufacturer can
also credibly commit to a sequence of prices because of reputation factors, legal factors, etc.
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time, the manufacturer can price discriminate between retailers who are competing in the same
market, as long as the retailer(s) with high wholesale price sensitivity has lower unit inventory
holding costs than the retailer(s) with low wholesale price sensitivity. Because of the ability to
price discriminate, the manufacturer can pro¯t from trade promotions. This perhaps explains the
paradoxical trend, as noted by Ailawadi, Farris, and Shames (1999), that \at the peak of the trade-
promotion controversy, manufacturers' pro¯ts increased at a fairly steady rate, whereas retailers'
pro¯ts were stable at best.
Our analysis also sheds some light on why manufacturers typically \allow" forward buying,
but vehemently oppose any \diversion". Our analysis suggests that forward buying makes price-
discrimination possible, but diversion weakens the price discrimination mechanism. Furthermore,
Proposition 1 suggests that trade promotions could also alleviate the double marginalization prob-
lem. Therefore, the channel as a whole could bene¯t from such a practice because the manufacturer
can induce the dominant retailer to set a lower retail price by charging the dominant retailer with
a lower wholesale price | a lower retail price increases channel pro¯ts in a dyadic channel where
the linear wholesale price contract is in use. Indeed, such bene¯ts can be substantial, as we will
show through numerical analyses next.
4. E®ects of Trade Promotions
A preliminary examination of the value of the price discrimination explanation for trade promotions
can be made based on its ability to explain how trade promotions are practiced. To this end, we
conducted numerical analyses to show the possible e®ects of trade promotions on players' pro¯ts
and social welfare. The results from the numerical analyses are limited in their generalizability, but
su±cient to motivate potential explanations for: 1) why trade promotions are frequently observed
for packaged goods but rarely observed for perishable goods; 2) why chain stores are happy with
trade promotions but independent and convenience stores are not; and 3) why manufacturers started
complaining about the e®ectiveness of trade promotions as retailers became larger.
13
Table 1 lists the parameters used in the numerical study. We discuss our ¯ndings in detail in
the following subsections.
Table 1: Values of Parameters in Numerical Analyses
1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.15, 1.20, 1.25, 1.30, 1.35, 1.40, 1.45, 1.50b1
+ ∞h2
0.0005, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.11, 0.12h1
1b
1a
ValuesParameters
Manufacturer's Incentives to O®er Trade Promotions: Intuitively, all else being equal, the
manufacturer will be more willing to o®er trade promotions to retailers as a price discrimination
mechanism if the dominant retailer has a lower unit holding cost. Furthermore, the incidence of
trade promotions also depends on the size of the dominant retailer. All else being equal, if b1 is
smaller (b1 closes to b), the manufacturer has less of an incentive to o®er trade promotions since the
dominant retailer is selling a bigger proportion of the total demand. The bene¯ts from inducing
the dominant retailer to charge a lower retail price will not o®set the cost. If b1 is larger (b1 closes
to 3b2 ), the manufacturer also has less of an incentive to o®er trade promotions. This is because
a larger b1 gives the dominant retailer the incentive to charge a lower retail price, as a large b1
implies a high consumer price sensitivity. Only for the intermediate values of b1, the manufacturer
will be willing to use trade promotions to price discriminate between the dominant retailer and the
retailers in the competitive fringe. Figure 5 and Result 1 below con¯rm these intuitions.
Result 1 Trade promotions can be pro¯table to the manufacturer when the dominant retailer's
unit holding cost h1 is su±ciently low at any given b1. At any given h1, the manufacturer has
incentives to o®er trade promotions when the dominant retailer is su±ciently dominant, but not
overly dominant (b1 is of an intermediate value).
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Figure 5: Manufacturer's Promotion Boundary
Result 1 suggests that trade promotions are not always bene¯cial to the manufacturer. Only
in those channel settings where the dominant retailer is not too dominant, or inventory holding
costs vary su±ciently among retailers, are trade promotions bene¯cial to the manufacturer. This
suggests that one is less likely to observe trade promotions in product categories, such as produce
and frozen foods, where the holding costs for these products are quite high and similar for both
chain stores and independents. The easy-to-store items such as canned food or detergents, however,
are expected to have more shipments on trade promotions.
Result 1 also suggests that the presence of a very dominant retailer (very low b1) in a distribution
channel is not conducive to the functioning of trade promotions as a price discrimination mechanism.
At any given inventory holding cost h1, the more dominant the dominant retailer is in a channel,
the less likely the manufacturer will resort to trade promotions. This suggests that one is less likely
to observe trade promotions in product categories such as toys and o±ce supplies where power
retailers signi¯cantly dominate.
E®ects of Trade Promotions on Sales: A lower h1 can facilitate price discrimination through
trade promotions. Sales are therefore expected to increase with a smaller h1. When the dominant
retailer has a smaller b1 or equivalently a larger demand share, the manufacturer will have a lower
incentive to o®er trade promotions. When b1 is small, the double marginalization problem is worse,
and sales do not increase as much.
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Table 2: Increase in Sales under Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy Relative to Single-Wholesale-
Price Strategy (%)
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%10.00%10.86%11.88%13.17%15.04%16.41%18.82%1.5
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%6.75%7.17%7.59%8.73%9.59%10.51%11.82%13.58%14.89%17.22%1.45
0.00%0.00%4.85%5.27%5.70%6.12%6.55%7.42%8.29%9.16%10.41%12.06%13.30%15.56%1.4
0.00%3.33%3.76%4.18%4.61%5.04%5.47%6.06%6.94%7.82%8.94%10.49%11.70%13.84%1.35
0.00%2.20%2.63%3.07%3.50%3.93%4.37%4.80%5.55%6.43%7.43%8.85%10.02%12.04%1.3
0.00%1.03%1.47%1.91%2.35%2.79%3.24%3.68%4.10%5.00%5.86%7.27%8.31%10.17%1.25b1
0.00%0.00%0.27%0.72%1.17%1.62%2.07%2.52%2.97%3.52%4.43%5.57%6.51%8.23%1.2
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%-0.05%0.41%0.86%1.32%1.78%1.98%2.91%3.93%4.71%6.21%1.15
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%-0.38%0.09%0.56%1.03%1.33%2.19%2.89%4.12%1.1
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%-0.21%0.27%0.67%1.11%1.97%1.05
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%1
0.120.110.10.090.080.070.060.050.040.030.020.010.0050.0005
holding cost h1
Table 2 shows the percentage increase in the manufacturer's sales by using multiple wholesale
prices as opposed to the sales by using single wholesale price, i.e.,
Qh1¡Qs
Qs
£ 100% where Qs =
a(2b1¡b)
4b1
as shown in Lemma 1. This leads to the result below.
Result 2 Increase in average sales per period can decrease in the dominant retailer's holding cost
h1 given b1, and is increasing in the dominant retailer's price sensitivity parameter b1 given h1.
Result 2 and Table 2 suggest that when the manufacturer uses trade promotions to price dis-
criminate between retailers, its sales can increase due to the reduced retail price, and such an
increase is larger for a smaller h1 and/or a larger b1. As shown in Accenture (2001), 95% of the
interviewed manufacturers cite \Increase Store Sales" as the top reason for trade promotions.17
Result 2 and Table 2 provide a potential rationale for such an almost unanimous citation from
manufacturers about the reasons for trade promotions.
E®ects of Trade Promotions on Pro¯ts: As a lower h1 facilitates price discrimination through
trade promotions, the manufacturer's pro¯ts are expected to increase with a smaller h1.
18 When
17The 2004 ACNielsen Report on Trade Promotions shows similar result: the top three reasons for manufacturers
to run trade promotions are \increase sales volume", \increase market share", and \maintain current volume" that
together account for 83% of responses (ACNielsen 2004).
18Our numerical study shows that N is decreasing in h1 and increasing in b1.
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Table 3: Increase in The Manufacturer's Pro¯t under Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy Relative
to Single-Wholesale-Price Strategy (%)
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.06%0.47%0.92%1.54%2.44%3.14%4.38%1.5
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.01%0.27%0.55%0.90%1.38%1.90%2.63%3.66%4.45%5.86%1.45
0.00%0.00%0.02%0.31%0.61%0.91%1.22%1.63%2.19%2.77%3.61%4.76%5.64%7.23%1.4
0.00%0.07%0.40%0.73%1.07%1.42%1.78%2.18%2.83%3.51%4.43%5.70%6.68%8.45%1.35
0.00%0.21%0.58%0.97%1.36%1.76%2.16%2.57%3.26%4.04%5.02%6.41%7.49%9.43%1.3
0.00%0.06%0.50%0.94%1.39%1.85%2.31%2.78%3.39%4.28%5.30%6.81%7.97%10.07%1.25b1
0.00%0.00%0.05%0.56%1.08%1.60%2.13%2.67%3.21%4.11%5.17%6.77%7.99%10.21%1.2
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.27%0.87%1.48%2.10%2.72%3.34%4.56%6.11%7.36%9.63%1.15
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.16%0.87%1.59%2.31%3.14%4.63%5.82%8.00%1.1
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.35%1.20%2.18%3.09%4.87%1.05
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%1
0.120.110.10.090.080.070.060.050.040.030.020.010.0050.0005
holding cost h1
the dominant retailer has a larger demand share (a smaller b1), the pro¯tability of trade promotions
for the manufacturer is decreasing, as there is less surplus the manufacturer could take from the
competitive fringe through price discrimination. Table 3 shows the percentage increase in the
manufacturer's pro¯t by using multiple wholesale prices as opposed to a single wholesale price, i.e.,
¦h1¡¦s
¦s
£ 100% where ¦s = a
2(2b1¡b)2
8bb21
as shown in Lemma 1. This leads to the result below.
Result 3 The increased pro¯ts from trade promotions as opposed to a single wholesale price for
the manufacturer are decreasing in the dominant retailer's holding cost h1, and has an inverted-U
relationship with the dominant retailer's price sensitivity parameter b1.
Result 3 provides a potential rationale for the vocal complaints in recent years by the manufac-
turers regarding the e®ectiveness of trade promotions. As dominant retailers such as chain stores
and warehouse clubs become larger (small b1), the bene¯ts of trade promotions to the manufacturer
decrease. It is such a change that prompts some manufacturers to re-evaluate the e®ectiveness of
their trade promotions. From this perspective, it is easy to see why practitioners recognize that
\success (of trade promotions) will be elusive unless independents are involved" and as far as the
e®ectiveness of trade promotions is concerned, manufacturers \need a strong, viable independent
sector" (Progressive Grocer Annual Report 2000, page 30).
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We can also examine how retailers' pro¯tability is a®ected by the same parameters h1 and b1.
We summarize our results below.
Result 4 The bene¯ts from trade promotions for the dominant retailer can decrease in its holding
cost h1 and have an inverted-U relationship with b1. The competitive fringe retailers can become
either worse o® or better o® due to trade promotions. Their gain from trade promotions can increase
with h1 and can have a U-shaped relationship with b1.
Intuitively, as the holding cost h1 is a direct cost to the dominant retailer, a higher h1 will reduce
the dominant retailer's pro¯t. Our analysis shows that the increase in the dominant retailer's pro¯ts
has the highest value for the intermediate values of b1 (Figure 6 in Technical Appendix TB veri¯es
this result). The intuition for this is as follows. The dominant retailer's pro¯ts are a®ected by two
factors. One is the average pro¯t from each unit sold, and the other is the total number of units
sold. When b1 is large (close to
3b
2 ), the manufacturer o®ers a higher promotional depth relative to
the single-wholesale-price strategy (see Table 4) and the increase in the dominant retailer's average
pro¯t from each sale as opposed to the single-wholesale-price strategy gets higher. However, for
any p, its demand share is small for a large b1. The e®ect of a small demand share dominates the
e®ect of a high average pro¯t from each sale and, therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t is low
for a large b1. When b1 is small (close to b), the dominant retailer has a large portion of demand,
but the average pro¯t from each sale is small, as the manufacturer o®ers a higher w1. Thus, the
dominant retailer's pro¯ts will again be small. Therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t is ¯rst
increasing, and then decreasing with b1.
The numerical study also suggests that the pricing cycle will be shorter (N is smaller) for a
higher h1. As the ¯rst period within a pricing cycle is the only period during which the retailers in
the competitive fringe can make a pro¯t, they will have higher average pro¯ts with shorter pricing
cycles, implying that the competitive fringe's pro¯t increases in h1.
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Table 4: Promotional Depth under Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy Relative to Single-Wholesale-
Price Strategy (%)
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%17.50%16.86%18.63%19.17%18.79%19.41%19.83%1.5
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%12.86%12.51%12.17%16.36%15.70%17.38%16.40%17.40%17.94%18.25%1.45
0.00%0.00%12.63%12.27%11.92%11.57%11.21%15.20%14.51%13.82%15.07%15.95%16.42%16.57%1.4
0.00%12.06%11.70%11.33%10.97%10.60%10.24%14.00%13.29%12.58%13.71%14.46%14.48%14.83%1.35
0.00%11.13%10.76%10.38%10.00%9.62%9.24%8.87%12.05%11.31%12.30%12.92%12.86%13.01%1.3
0.00%10.20%9.80%9.41%9.02%8.63%8.24%7.84%10.77%10.00%10.86%10.61%10.81%11.09%1.25b1
0.00%0.00%8.84%8.44%8.03%7.62%7.21%6.80%6.39%8.66%7.86%8.99%9.08%9.09%1.2
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%7.03%6.60%6.17%5.75%5.32%7.29%6.45%6.58%6.92%7.01%1.15
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%5.12%4.67%4.23%3.78%5.00%4.94%4.73%4.81%1.1
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%2.65%2.18%2.58%2.54%2.50%1.05
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%1
0.120.110.10.090.080.070.060.050.040.030.020.010.0050.0005
holding cost h1
The competitive fringe gets the lowest pro¯t for intermediate values of b1 and more pro¯ts for
smaller and larger b1's as expected. Also note that for a large b1 and a large h1, the competitive
fringe could become better o® due to trade promotions. For a given b1, it is optimal for the
manufacturer to choose a shorter pricing cycle when h1 goes up. Thus, the promotional period
1, when the competitive fringe can get positive surplus, will occur more frequently as h1 becomes
larger and the competitive fringe becomes better o® as a result. For a given h1, the manufacturer
will o®er a lower w1 but will choose a longer pricing cycle when b1 becomes larger. When b1 is
very large, the positive e®ect of a lower w1 on the competitive fringe's pro¯ts will dominate the
negative e®ect of a longer pricing cycle and the competitive fringe becomes better o®. Therefore,
the competitive fringe's pro¯t is ¯rst decreasing, and then increasing in b1.
E®ects of Trade Promotions on Social Welfare: Many researchers have argued that trade
promotions are harmful to a channel because of increased inventory holding costs. Although our
model also suggests that trade promotions increase inventory holding costs, we ¯nd that trade
promotions can potentially bene¯t the system as a whole by enabling the manufacturer to price
discriminate between retailers. We state this result formally below (Figure 7 in Technical Appendix
TB veri¯es this result).
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Result 5 Trade promotions can increase social welfare. The increase in social welfare is smaller
when the dominant retailer's holding cost h1 is larger or b1 is smaller (or the dominant retailer is
more dominant).
The source of the welfare improvement comes from the fact that price discrimination can allevi-
ate the problem of double marginalization in the channel, to the bene¯t of not only the manufacturer
and the retailers, but also the consumers. Trade promotions induce the dominant retailer to choose
a low retail price. Although the retail price goes up by h12 per period because of the presence
of the holding cost h1, the retail prices in most periods will be lower than the benchmark retail
price ps =
a(2b1+b)
4bb1
, the retail price that the dominant retailer would set if the manufacturer were to
charge all retailers the same time-invariant wholesale price ws =
a(2b1¡b)
2bb1
. Interestingly, competitive
fringe may even bene¯t from trade promotions as shown above. This is because the channel pro¯t
increases as the double marginalization problem is lessened and all channel members, including
the competitive fringe, can bene¯t from increased channel sales. Even when the competitive fringe
becomes worse-o® due to price discrimination, the total social welfare can still increase because
of the lower retail price set by dominant retailer. Consequently, trade promotions can improve
channel e±ciency and increase social welfare.
Overall, what emerges from Proposition 1 and Results 1-5 is a di®erent perspective on trade
promotions. Manufacturers embrace trade promotions because the practice allows them to im-
plement price discrimination in a distribution channel. In light of this perspective, it is rather
understandable that when manufacturers run trade promotions, they allow forward buying, but
disallow diversion. Our model can also explain why retailers do not all endorse this practice.
The dominant retailer favors such a practice as it stands to bene¯t from trade promotions due to
its low inventory holding costs. The competitive fringe could oppose such a practice, as it may
become worse o® because of the e®ective price discrimination that trade promotions achieve. How-
ever, this does not mean that such a practice is harmful because social welfare can increase with
this practice. Finally, manufacturers may have incentives to abandon this practice, as the retail
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consolidation continues.19
5. Extensions
Our basic model leaves three important questions unanswered so far.
1. Does price-discrimination necessarily require multiple wholesale prices, as suggested by the
solution to the optimization problem (3.3)? If it does, such a theory would be rather counter-
factual, as in practice, we often observe manufacturers alternating between two wholesale
prices in a given period of time: the regular and discounted wholesale prices.
2. Does a price discrimination explanation of trade promotions also hold in the situations where
the competitive fringe has ¯nite (as oppose to in¯nite) inventory holding costs?
3. Does the price discrimination explanation of trade promotions depend on the assumption
of dominant retailer channel (i.e., only the dominant retailer has pricing power)? In other
words, if the competitive fringe independently and competitively sets its retail price, would
the manufacturer's incentives to use trade promotions to price discriminate go away?
5.1 Comparing 2-Price Model with the Full Model
In our basic model, as the optimal solution, the manufacturer's wholesale price increases every
period, after the initial dip, over the rest of the pricing cycle. This feature of our solution is not
necessary as two price points are su±cient for price discrimination to occur. In fact, there are three
ways to reconcile our optimal solution with the frequently observed trade promotion practice of
two price points. First, the parameters may be such that the optimal solution calls for a regular
wholesale price and a discounted price. In other words, there is a possibility that a 2-price solution
19This may well explain why the portion of trade promotion budgets allocated to o®-invoice allowances has decreased
from about 90 percent in mid-1990s to about 35 percent in recent years (Cannondale Associates 2003), but chain
retailers, as they become more dominant through consolidation, prefer o®-invoice trade promotions to performance-
based promotions such as scan-backs. G¶omez, Rao, and McLaughlin (2005) ¯nd that retailers with larger share
of private label, larger annual sales, and stronger brand positioning do demand more trade promotion funds to
o®-invoices.
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Table 5: Di®erence in The Manufacturer's Pro¯t between Multiple-Wholesale-Price Strategy &
Two-Wholesale-Price Strategy (%)
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.03%0.18%0.37%0.64%0.73%0.68%0.31%1.5
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.07%0.26%0.48%0.64%0.72%0.66%0.29%1.45
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.08%0.31%0.55%0.62%0.69%0.62%0.27%1.4
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.04%0.32%0.58%0.58%0.63%0.57%0.25%1.35
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.26%0.52%0.51%0.55%0.50%0.22%1.3
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.13%0.47%0.39%0.47%0.42%0.19%1.25b1
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.34%0.26%0.35%0.34%0.15%1.2
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.22%0.24%0.25%0.11%1.15
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.10%0.13%0.14%0.07%1.1
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.04%0.05%0.03%1.05
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%1
0.120.110.10.090.080.070.060.050.040.030.020.010.0050.0005
holding cost h1
may indeed be optimal. Of course, such an explanation would be, admittedly, quite tenuous, given
that our model does not o®er a way to restrict the parameter space.
Second, we show that using only two price points allows the manufacturer to price discriminate
between the dominant retailer and competitive fringe e®ectively and to capture the bulk of the
bene¯ts from trade promotions. When the manufacturer is \restricted" to adopt the two-wholesale-
price strategy only, all results under the multiple-wholesale-price strategy will hold! This means
that this practice can also be justi¯ed based on the tradeo® between simplicity in administering
trade promotions and pro¯t gains. As Table 5 shows, the pro¯t that the manufacturer sacri¯ces
when switching from a regime of unconstrained multiple wholesale prices to a regime of constrained
two wholesale prices is quite small (smaller than 1%). This implies that even with the minimalist
approach of two price points, the manufacturer can reap substantial bene¯ts from trade promotions.
Finally, it is assumed that price changes are costless. In practice, cost of changing prices can be
substantial, both in terms of monetary costs, and in terms of good will (Levy et al 1997). When
such a cost is considered, the manufacturer may want to use two price points.
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5.2 Finite Inventory Holding Costs for Both Retailers
If the competitive fringe has a ¯nite (as oppose to in¯nite in the basic model) unit inventory
holding cost but such cost is still higher than the dominant retailer's, i.e., 0 < h1 < h2 < 1,
the manufacturer can still use trade promotions to price discriminate. The proofs are in Technical
Appendix. The price discrimination comes about because of the extent to which di®erent retailers
can take advantage of trade promotions due to di®erences in holding costs.
5.3 Generalizing from the Dominant Retailer Model
Consider, for instance, an alternative demand model given by
Q1 = a1 ¡ b1p1 + c1p2
Q2 = a2 ¡ b2p2 + c2p1
where pi is the price for retailer i (Sayman et al 2002). In Technical Appendix TA, we show
that in this model the manufacturer can price discriminate between retailers through trade pro-
motions, even if both retailers independently and simultaneously make pricing decisions, as long
as minfb1; b2g > maxfc1; c2g. In other words, as long as the competing retailers exhibit di®erent
price sensitivities with regard to the wholesale price, and the higher price-sensitivity retailer has a
lower inventory holding cost, the manufacturer can bene¯t from price discrimination through trade
promotions.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
Many researchers have argued that trade promotions are harmful to manufacturers and to the
distribution channel because of the added inventory-holding costs. Using a dominant retailer model,
we show that trade promotions can bene¯t manufacturers and the channel precisely because of
the added inventory cost: these costs provide the manufacturers with an opportunity to price
discriminate between a dominant retailer and the competitive fringe. We show that the price
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discriminating function of trade promotions is not speci¯c to the dominant retailer model and
works for other competitive models also.
What this analysis implies is that manufacturers may want to proceed cautiously to \rein
in" the practice of trade promotions. At the minimum, they need to weigh the bene¯t of price-
discrimination against any possible increase in the inventory and production costs in making such
decisions.
The price discrimination perspective also sheds some new light on the practice of trade pro-
motions. At a more general level, our analysis explains a few otherwise puzzling sets of practices
associated with trade promotions: manufacturers do not seem to complain about the e®ectiveness
of trade promotions or want to take the initiative of abandoning the practice (or when they do,
they su®er); manufacturers allow forward buying but not diversion; power retailers urge for trade
promotions but small and independent retailers frequently condemn the practice as unfair. Our
analysis shows that price discrimination implemented through trade promotions could favor the
manufacturer and the dominant retailer at the expense of the competitive fringe, and e®ective
price discrimination can be implemented if there is forward buying but no diverting on the part of
the dominant retailer.
Our analysis also shows that price discrimination induced through trade promotions can be
welfare-enhancing as it alleviates the problem of double-marginalization in a distribution channel.
We also show that trade promotions can increase social welfare, as the di®erence between retailers'
holding costs is su±ciently large or the dominant retailer's market share is su±ciently small (b1 is
large). Surprisingly, our analysis also ¯nds that trade promotions may also bene¯t the competitive
fringe under some conditions. The bene¯ts to the competitive fringe come during promotional
periods, in which all retailers enjoy the low wholesale price. Thus, when the dominant retailer has
a high holding cost h1 and a low market share (large b1), the manufacturer will promote frequently
with a high promotion depth to the bene¯t of the competitive fringe.
Our analysis suggests that one is more likely to observe trade promotions in industries or
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product categories where inventory holding cost is su±ciently small, or power retailers are not too
dominant. These are testable predictions.
One could argue that trade promotions as a price discrimination mechanism are potentially
more e®ective and robust than other pricing mechanisms such as quantity discounts or a menu
of two part tari®s (Kuksov and Pazgal 2007). For instance, when a manufacturer uses quantity
discounts to price discriminate against small retailers, the small retailers may be able to get together
and pool their purchases to avail themselves of a low wholesale price. They can act similarly under
a menu of two-part tari®s. However, with trade promotions, the competitive fringe retailers need
to invest in joint warehouse facilities to be able to take advantage of periodic price deals. Said
di®erently, as a price discrimination mechanism, trade promotions generate potentially less leakage
than other posted price mechanisms.
While we believe that our analysis has generated some interesting new insights, it is important
to point out the limitations of our model. In our model, we do not explicitly model product di®er-
entiation, although a downward sloping demand curve for the dominant retailer does suggest some
di®erentiation in its o®erings. If the retailers in the competitive fringe can o®er vertically di®er-
entiated products to customers, we suspect that the competitive fringe will have more power and
can be more pro¯table compared with the current model.20 We do not consider the manufacturer's
holding costs in the model. If the manufacturer has to hold inventory instead of transferring all
inventory to retailers and has lower inventory holding costs than retailers, will trade promotions
still bene¯t the channel? We suspect that trade promotions can still be bene¯cial as the motivation
for and the e®ects of, price discrimination in a channel do not go away because of a lower inventory
holding cost on the part of the manufacturer. We also assume that the manufacturer is selling a
single product through retailers. In multiple product setting, studies on how trade promotions on
one product a®ect the pro¯ts of other products may generate additional insights (Chen and Xie
2007). Finally, we assume that the manufacturer is a monopoly in supplying products to retailers
20We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
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(Liu and Zhang 2006). It is important for future research to investigate whether trade promotions
could still help manufacturers to price discriminate between retailers in a competitive context. We
suspect that they still could, as competition rarely negates any incentive for price discrimination.
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Appendices
A. Retailers' Incentives To Reduce Holding Costs
Assume 0 < h1 · h2 < 1. The manufacturer will o®er a wholesale price w1 in the ¯rst period
and wi in period i. Further, it will charge a w1 and choose a pricing cycle length N such that the
competitive fringe will not make \bridge-buying", otherwise the manufacturer will o®er a single
wholesale price ws, instead of o®ering a trade promotion with both retailers making bridge-buying.
Intuitively, the dominant retailer, who is making \bridge buying", will have a larger incentive to
reduce unit holding cost since the dominant retailer will reduce unit acquisition cost in each of the
N periods. The competitive fringe, who has a unit holding cost h2 > h1 and is making \forward
buying" for a shorter period than N, will have a smaller incentive since it will bene¯t from reduced
holding cost in less than N periods. We will formally prove this result below.
Dominant retailer's incentives
Given w1 and N , the dominant retailer will choose a retail price p
i = a+b1w1+b1h1(i¡1)2b1 in period
i and its e®ective unit acquisition cost in period i will be equal to w1 + (i ¡ 1)h1, (i = 1; :::; N).
Therefore, the dominant retailer's pro¯t in period i is given by
¼id = [p
i ¡ w1 ¡ (i¡ 1)h1](a¡ b1pi); (A.1)
and its total pro¯t in one pricing cycle is given by
¼Td =
NX
i=1
¼id =
NX
i=1
[pi ¡ w1 ¡ (i¡ 1)h1](a¡ b1pi) (A.2)
The dominant retailer's incentive to reduce holding cost h1 is therefore given by
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@¼Td
@h1
=
NX
i=1
@¼id
@h1
= ¡
NX
i=1
(i¡ 1)(a¡ b1pi) = ¡
NX
i=1
(i¡ 1)Qdi < 0 (A.3)
That is, the dominant retailer's pro¯t will be higher as its holding cost h1 goes down.
Competitive fringe's incentives
We have stated that the retailers in the competitive fringe are not making bridge-buying as the
dominant retailer is. Otherwise, trade promotions will not be pro¯table for the manufacturer. How-
ever, the competitive fringe's non-in¯nity unit holding cost h2 makes it probable for the competitive
fringe to make forward-buying in the promotional period. Let ¹x be the number of periods in which
the competitive fringe's e®ective unit acquisition cost in period i = 1; :::; ¹x is lower than the retail
21Here we use marginal analysis in studying retailers' incentives to reduce unit holding cost. That is, given w1, N ,
and ¹x (for competitive fringe), the dominant retailer's (any competitive fringe retailer's) incentive of reducing unit
holding cost h1 (h2) is analyzed here.
29
price pi, if the competitive fringe makes forward-buying in the ¯rst period at the wholesale price
w1. That is, w1+ (¹x¡ 1)h2 · p¹x and w1+ (¹x+1¡ 1)h2 > p¹x+1. Knowing the competitive fringe's
e®ective acquisition cost, the manufacturer will not charge the retailers in competitive fringe a
wholesale price equal to pi in periods 1 to ¹x, but charge them the e®ective unit acquisition cost
w1+ (i¡ 1)h2 to make competitive fringe retailers indi®erent between making forward-buying and
ordering from the manufacturer in each period. Since the e®ective unit acquisition cost is not
lower than the promotional price w1, the manufacturer could have higher pro¯ts by charging them
the e®ective acquisition cost than announcing a wholesale price equal to the retail price in period
i = 1; :::; ¹x. Assume x makes the constraint equal
w1 + (x¡ 1)h2 = px = a+ b1w1 + b1h1(x¡ 1)
2b1
; (A.4)
and we get x = 1 + a¡b1w1b1(2h2¡h1) . Therefore we have,
¹x = int[x] = int[1 +
a¡ b1w1
b1(2h2 ¡ h1) ] and
x¡ 1 < ¹x · x (A.5)
Assume there are C identical retailers in the competitive fringe, each of whom has a demand
proportion of 1CQci =
1
C (b1 ¡ b)pi in period i = 1; :::; N . Any retailer's e®ective unit acquisition
cost of each item sold in period i · ¹x equals ci2 = w1 + (i¡ 1)h2, and the retailer's pro¯t in period
i is given by
¹¼ic = [p
i ¡ w1 ¡ (i¡ 1)h2]£ b1 ¡ b
C
pi (A.6)
The retailer's pro¯ts from period ¹x+1 to period N are zero because the manufacturer will take all
surplus from the competitive fringe by charging a wholesale price slightly lower than the market
price. So the total pro¯t within a pricing cycle for any retailer in competitive fringe is given by
¹¼Tc =
¹xX
i=1
¹¼ic =
¹xX
i=1
[pi ¡w1 ¡ (i¡ 1)h2]£ b1 ¡ b
C
pi (A.7)
The incentive for any retailer in the competitive fringe to reduce holding cost h2 is given by
@¹¼Tc
@h2
=
¹xX
i=1
@¹¼ic
@h2
= ¡
¹xX
i=1
(i¡ 1)b1 ¡ b
C
pi = ¡
¹xX
i=1
(i¡ 1) 1
C
Qci < 0 (A.8)
That is, the competitive fringe's pro¯t will be higher as the holding cost h2 goes down.
Since ¹x < N , equations (A.3) and (A.8) show that the dominant retailer has more incentives
than any competitive fringe to reduce holding costs if the dominant retailer's demand (Qdi) is not
smaller than the demand of any retailer in the competitive fringe ( 1CQci) in periods i = 1; :::; ¹x, orPN
i=1(i¡ 1)(a¡ b1pi) >
P¹x
i=1(i¡ 1) b1¡bC pi for Qdi ¸ QciC . Q.E.D.
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B. Proof of Lemma 1. Conditional on wholesale price ws, the dominant retailer's pro¯t in any
period is given by,
¼d;s = (ps ¡ws)(a¡ b1ps): (B.1)
The F.O.C. of the pro¯t function determines the dominant retailer's optimal retail price, which is
given by
ps =
a+ b1ws
2b1
(B.2)
and retailers' demands are given by(
Qd;s = a¡ b1ps = a¡b1ws2
Qc;s = (b1 ¡ b)ps = (b1¡b)(a+b1ws)2b1
: (B.3)
The manufacturer chooses ws to maximize its pro¯t ¦s = ws(Qd;s+Qc;s). The optimal ws is given
by
ws =
a(2b1 ¡ b)
2bb1
: (B.4)
Given ws =
a(2b1¡b)
2bb1
, it is easy to derive other results in the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. The way to prove Lemma 2 is to consider the dominant retailer's decisions
in an arbitrary period based on e®ective unit acquisition cost. The dominant retailer purchases
inventory in the ¯rst period at a wholesale price w1 and will be charged a unit holding cost h1 > 0
per period for inventory it carries from one period to the next. Thus the e®ective unit acquisition
cost of the units sold in period j = 1; :::; N is equal to w1 + (j ¡ 1)h1. Here w1 is the original
purchase cost and (i¡1)h1 is the holding cost charged to each unit sold in period i. Therefore, the
dominant retailer's pro¯t for period j is given by,
¼jd;h1 = [p
j ¡w1 ¡ (j ¡ 1)h1](a¡ b1pj) (B.5)
and it will choose a retail price pj = a+b1w1+b1h1(j¡1)2b1 in period j. Both the dominant retailer and
the competitive fringe pay the promotional wholesale price w1 in the ¯rst period. From the second
period on, the manufacturer will charge the competitive fringe a wholesale price equal to the retail
price to get all surplus from the competitive fringe since the competitive fringe takes the retail price
pj as given in any period j. That is, wj = p
j for j = 2; :::; N . The manufacturer's average pro¯t
per period in a pricing cycle is given below.
¦h1 =
1
N
[w1
NX
i=1
(a¡ b1pi) +w1(b1 ¡ b)p1 +
NX
j=2
wj(b1 ¡ b)pj ]; (B.6)
where
PN
i=1(a ¡ b1pi) is the dominant retailer's total ordering quantity, pi = a+b1w1+b1h1(i¡1)2b1 is
the retail price in period i, and wj = p
j is the wholesale price in period j = 2; :::; N . Since ¦h1 is
strictly concave in w1, F.O.C. solves w1 as follows.
w1 =
N [4ab1 ¡ 2ab¡ bb1h1(N ¡ 1)]
2b1[b(N + 1) + b1(N ¡ 1)] (B.7)
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Other results in Lemma 2 can then be easily derived. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. If 0 · h1 < h2 =1, the manufacturer will o®er wholesale prices w1 and
wi (i = 2; ::;N) as in equation (3.1). For items sold in the promotional period, both the dominant
retailer and competitive fringe are having same unit acquisition cost w1. For items sold in period
i = 2; :::;N , the unit acquisition cost for the dominant retailer is equal to w1 + h1(i ¡ 1) and the
cost for the competitive fringe is equal to the wholesale price in that period wi =
a+b1w1+b1h1(i¡1)
2b1
.
We have wi ¡ [w1 + h1(i ¡ 1)] = a¡b1[w1+h1(i¡1)]2b1 =
a¡b1pi
b1
> 0. Therefore, the competitive fringe
is paying a higher average unit acquisition cost in a pricing cycle than the dominant retailer. If
0 · h1 < h2 < 1, the same logic still applies as long as the optimal pricing cycle length N ¸ 2.
The only di®erence is that it is possible that the retailers in the competitive fringe would also like
to carry some inventory from one period to the next, but they will carry items for fewer periods
than the dominant retailer because of their higher inventory holding cost. If they are carrying
items for the same periods as the dominant retailer, trade promotions will not be worthy for the
manufacturer and the optimal N will be equal to 1, i.e., no trade promotions are o®ered. Q.E.D.
C. Credibility of Manufacturer's Announcement of N and wi (i = 1; :::; N)
In this section we will show that the manufacturer's announcement of both the length of pricing
cycle N and the wholesale price wi for each period i within a pricing cycle consisting of N periods
(i = 1; :::; N) are credible. That is, given the announced N and wi (i = 1; :::;N) determined as
in Lemma 2, the manufacturer will not have incentives to deviate from them. The intuition is as
follows. Given the preannounced optimal N, the manufacturer will not have incentive to extend
N to any ~N > N . The reason for the manufacturer to run trade promotions is because trade
promotions will provide a higher average pro¯t per pricing cycle for the manufacturer than a time
invariant wholesale price. If a manufacturer deviate from N to ~N > N and charge the optimal time
invariant wholesale price ws as shown in Lemma 1 for periods N +1; :::; ~N (the dominant retailer's
inventory ordered in period 1 will be depleted in period N), the manufacturer will get a lower
average pro¯t per period for periods N + 1; :::; ~N . Given the preannounced N , the manufacturer
will have no incentive to deviate to any ¹N < N either. In a pricing cycle, the manufacturer gets a
much lower pro¯t from units sold in period 1 than the average pro¯t per period in the pricing cycle
since the wholesale price w1 is low and available to both the dominant retailer and competitive
fringe. In each period i (i = 2; :::; N), however, the manufacturer will get a higher than average
pro¯t from units sold in the period. The higher than average pro¯t comes from the manufacturer's
complete gain of competitive fringe's surplus by charging a wholesale price equal to retail price in
each period. If the manufacturer deviates to any ¹N < N , it will get a lower average pro¯t per
period for each pricing cycle since the manufacturer is cutting o® the high pro¯t periods ¹N+1; :::; N
while the dominant retailer will bring unsold units (due to the truncation of the pricing cycle) to
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the next pricing cycle. The manufacturer will thus have no incentive to either extend or shorten
a pricing cycle from N to any ~>N or ¹N < N . In any period i = 2; :::;N , the manufacturer will
have no incentive to deviate from the preannounced wi either. Since wi = p
i for i = 2; :::; N , the
manufacturer will not increase the wholesale price since such an increase will let the manufacturer
lose the pro¯t from competitive fringe by making the wholesale price for the competitive fringe
higher than the retail price. The manufacturer will also have no incentive to decrease wholesale
price. If the reduced wholesale price in any period i = 2; :::; N (denoted as ¹wi) is so low that
the dominant retailer ¯nds it pro¯table to make an order, it is equivalent to the case where the
manufacturer starts a new pricing cycle (equivalently, chooses an ¹N < N), which is not optimal for
the manufacturer as shown above. If the reduced wholesale price is not low enough to induce the
dominant retailer to order in period i = 2; :::; N , the manufacturer will lose a margin of wi ¡ ¹wi
from competitive fringe, which is also not optimal. Either way, the manufacturer will not get a
higher pro¯t by deviate from the preannounced wi. Thus, the manufacturer will not deviate from
the preannounced N and wi (i = 1; :::; N).
Now we will proceed the proof in the following steps. First, we will show that the manufacturer
will not have incentives to deviate from the optimal N . Second, we will show that the manufacturer
will not have incentives to deviate from wholesale price wi for each period i within a pricing
cycle consisting of N periods (i = 1; :::; N), given the dominant retailer's order in the ¯rst period
Q1d =
PN
i=1Qdi =
N
4 [2(a¡ b1w1)¡ b1h1(N ¡ 1)].
No Deviation from N
Given both dominant retailer's and competitive fringe's decisions in Lemma 2, the manufacturer will
not increase the length of pricing cycle from the optimal N to any ~N for N < ~N < 2N 22. Suppose
the manufacturer changes the length of pricing cycle from N to ~N after the dominant retailer
makes its order in the ¯rst period Q1d =
N
4 [2(a¡ b1w1)¡ b1h1(N ¡ 1)]. It is then optimal for the
manufacturer to set a wholesale price at ws =
a(2b1¡b)
2bb1
for each period j (j = N + 1; N + 2; :::; ~N)
and gets an average pro¯t per period of ¦s =
a2(2b1¡b)2
8bb21
for periods N + 1; N + 2; :::; ~N , if trade
promotions are not used between periods N + 1 and ~N 23. Since the reason for the manufacturer
to provide trade promotions is because trade promotions will provide a higher average pro¯t to
the manufacturer than a common time-invariant wholesale price to retailers, it is not optimal for
the manufacturer to deviate from N to any ~N > N . Now lets show the manufacturer also has no
incentives to shorten N to any ¹N < N . In order to prove so, we need the following lemma, which
shows that the manufacturer's pro¯t from sales in period N is the smallest among periods 2; :::; N .
22If ~N ¸ 2N , then the focal periods we focus on will be from period iN ¢N to period ~N where iN = int[ ~NN ]. We
will then get similar insights as in the case where N < ~N < 2N .
23An alternative way is for the manufacturer to use trade promotions to price discriminate between retailers between
periods N + 1 and ~N , but such a shorter pricing cycle will be suboptimal compared with the optimal pricing cycle
with a length of N since the optimal N is determined such that it pro¯t-dominates any other length of pricing cycle
[please see Problem (3.3)].
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Lemma 3 In a pricing cycle, the manufacturer's pro¯t from sales in a period is the minimum in
period j = minfN; bb1w1¡(b1¡b)(a¡b1h1)b1h1(b1¡b) g among periods 2; :::; N .
Proof of Lemma 3. The sales in any period j = 2; :::;N consists of two parts - sales of the items
the dominant retailer orders in period 1 at a wholesale price w1 and carries to period j and sales of
the items the ¯rms in competitive fringe order from the manufacturer at a wholesale price wj and
sell in period j. The sales in period j is equal to Qj = a¡ bpj = 2ab1¡ab¡bb1w1¡bb1h1(j¡1)2b1 as shown
in Lemma 2. Manufacturer's pro¯t from the sales in period j = 2; :::; N is thus given by
¦jh1 = w1Qdj + wjQcj
=
w1[a¡ b1w1 ¡ b1h1(j ¡ 1)]
2
+
(b1 ¡ b)[a+ b1w1 + b1h1(j ¡ 1)]2
4b21
(C.1)
The derivatives of ¦jh1 with respect to j are given by8><>:
d¦j
h1
dj =
h1[a(b1¡b)+b1h1(b1¡b)(N¡1)¡bb1w1]
2b1
d2¦j
h1
dj2
=
h21(b1¡b)
2 > 0
(C.2)
Since the twice derivative of ¦jh1 with respect to j is positive, ¦
j
h1
is strictly convex in j. Therefore,
the manufacturer's pro¯t ¦jh1 from sales is the minimum in period j = minfN;
bb1w1¡(b1¡b)(a¡b1h1)
b1h1(b1¡b) g
among periods 2; :::; N , where bb1w1¡(b1¡b)(a¡b1h1)b1h1(b1¡b) is solved from the F.O.C. of ¦
j
h1
. Q.E.D.
When the manufacturer o®ers trade promotions in period 1, the promotional wholesale price
w1 is same for both the dominant retailer and competitive fringe and w1 is di®erent from the
optimal constant wholesale price ws. Thus, the manufacturer's pro¯t from sales in period 1 is
smaller than the average pro¯t under constant wholesale price ¦s =
a2(2b1¡b)2
8bb21
. Since the reason
for the manufacturer to o®er trade promotions in the current model is because of a higher average
pro¯t in a pricing cycle than ¦s, the manufacturer's pro¯t from items sold in period 1 is therefore
smaller than the average pro¯t in a pricing cycle. Starting from period 2, the manufacturer will
have to get a higher pro¯t from the items sold in each period than the average pro¯t in order to
\compensate" the pro¯t \loss" in period 1. The higher than average pro¯t in each period comes
from sales to competitive fringe at a wholesale price of wi = p
i. Such a \compensation" process
continues until a period when the pro¯t from that period is no longer contributable to improving
the average pro¯t per period in a pricing cycle, i.e. the average pro¯t in that period is smaller than
the average pro¯t in a pricing cycle 24 25. Thus the manufacturer will have no incentive to \cut"
24Numerical study shows that within the wide parametric ranges
d¦
j
h1
dj
is negative for j = N . That is, the
manufacturer's average pro¯t in each period among periods 2; :::; N is decreasing in j for the studied parametric
values.
25The manufacturer's pro¯t from items sold in period i by both retailers instead of its pro¯t from items sold in
period i by competitive fringe only should be considered here. This is because if the manufacturer truncates a pricing
cycle at period i then the items that could have been sold by the dominant retailer in period i will be carried over to
the \new" pricing cycle in an in¯nitely repeated game.
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Table 6: Comparison of The Manufacturer's Pro¯t in Period minfN; bb1w1¡(b1¡b)(a¡b1h1)b1h1(b1¡b) g and Av-
erage Pro¯t
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.55%0.79%0.27%0.11%0.33%0.11%0.02%1.5
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%1.66%1.83%2.02%0.60%0.91%0.23%0.74%0.32%0.08%0.01%1.45
0.00%0.00%1.61%1.81%2.01%2.23%2.45%0.57%0.96%1.39%0.76%0.28%0.02%0.01%1.4
0.00%1.53%1.76%2.00%2.25%2.51%2.78%0.45%0.93%1.45%0.71%0.20%0.22%0.01%1.35
0.00%1.44%1.73%2.02%2.33%2.64%2.95%3.28%0.79%1.41%0.59%0.06%0.12%0.00%1.3
0.00%1.10%1.45%1.81%2.18%2.55%2.92%3.30%0.48%1.22%0.34%0.57%0.35%0.03%1.25b1
0.00%0.00%0.83%1.26%1.70%2.15%2.59%3.05%3.50%0.82%1.73%0.29%0.14%0.04%1.2
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.76%1.30%1.83%2.38%2.92%0.12%1.20%0.89%0.31%0.03%1.15
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.42%1.08%1.74%2.39%0.26%0.19%0.41%0.04%1.1
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.42%1.23%0.27%0.20%0.03%1.05
0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%0.00%1
0.120.110.10.090.080.070.060.050.040.030.020.010.0050.0005
holding cost h1
at any period i for 2 < i < N since such a cutting will let the manufacturer lose the high margin
in period i associated with the order from competitive fringe and, at the same time, orders from
the dominant retailer will not increase because any orders unsold due to the \cutting" will not be
absorbed by the dominant retailer but be carried over to and sold in the new pricing cycle. This
will generate a smaller average pro¯t per period in a pricing cycle.
Table 6 shows numerical that the manufacturer's pro¯t in period minfN; bb1w1¡(b1¡b)(a¡b1h1)b1h1(b1¡b) g
is always larger than its average pro¯t per period in the pricing cycle when the manufacturer
chooses to o®er trade promotions to retailers. Therefore, the manufacturer has no incentive
to truncate any pricing cycle into a pricing cycle with a length of ¹N < N since the period
minfN; bb1w1¡(b1¡b)(a¡b1h1)b1h1(b1¡b) g with the lowest average pro¯t among periods 2; :::; N has a higher
than average pro¯t. That is, the announcement of optimal N is credible and self-enforcing - the
manufacturer will not deviate to any ~N > N or ¹N < N in any period i = 2; :::; N within a pricing
cycle.
No Deviation from wi
In this subsection, we will show that the manufacturer will not deviate from pre-announced whole-
sale price wi in any period within a pricing cycle.
With the announced sequence of wholesale prices wi (i = 1; :::; N), the manufacturer will charge
the lowest wholesale price in period 1 in order to induce the dominant retailer to make forward-
buying. From period 2 until period N, the manufacturer will charge a wholesale price equal to
retail price in each period in order to take full surplus from competitive fringe. In any period
i = 2; :::; N , the manufacturer will not increase the wholesale price wi to any larger price since such
an increase will make the wholesale price higher than the retail price and thus the manufacturer
will lose sales from competitive fringe. The margin with the dominant retailer, at the same time,
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does not improve because there is no sales to the dominant retailer in any period except in period
1 in a pricing cycle.
The manufacturer will also have no incentive to lower the wholesale price wi in any period
i = 2; :::; N . Suppose the manufacturer sets a wholesale price ¹wi < wi in period i. One of the
following two consequences will happen. In the ¯rst consequence, the new wholesale price is not
low enough so the dominant retailer will keep selling inventory carried over from period 1, i.e.
¹wi ¸ w1 + h1(i ¡ 1). Such a decrease will then only decrease the manufacturer's pro¯t since the
margin the manufacturer gets from orders from competitive fringe is smaller while sales do not
change at all. In the other consequence, the new wholesale price makes it more pro¯table for the
dominant retailer to order from the manufacturer in period i, i.e. ¹wi < w1 + h1(i ¡ 1). This is
essentially same as the case where the manufacturer restarts a new pricing cycle. As shown above
that it is not optimal for the manufacturer to deviate from the pre-announced N to any ¹N < N ,
the manufacturer will not decrease wholesale price from wi to any ¹wi < w1 + h1(i ¡ 1) in period
i = 2; :::; N .
Therefore, the manufacturer's announcements of both the length of pricing cycle N and the
sequence of wholesale prices wi, i = 1; :::; N , are credible and self-enforcing. Q.E.D.
36
